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CREDIT ENHANCEMENT IN DOMESTIC
TRANSACTIONS: CONCEPTUALIZING THE
DEVICES AND REINVENTING THE LAW
Neil B. Cohen"
I. THE NEED FOR CREDIT ENHANCEMENT
In virtually all cases, creditors have a business reason to
extend credit; it is the profit motive, after all, that drives most
transactions. The profits generated by an extension of credit
may be direct, deriving from interest charges in excess of the
creditor's time value of money, or indirect, financing profitable
sales (that might not otherwise have occurred) of the creditor's
products to debtor/buyers. Many credit transactions generate
profits in both of these ways-enabling a profitable sale that
may not otherwise have taken place and making a separate
profit from the interest charged to the customer.
Individual extensions of credit are obviously profitable for
creditors only when the debtors pay their debts. Those who
extend credit repeatedly can profit despite a small number of
defaulting debtors, but will not profit in the aggregate if too
many debtors fail to pay their debts. Indeed, the loss associat-
ed with one defaulting debtor is typically several times larger
than the profit generated by a fully performing debtor. Take,
for example, a one-year $10,000 loan with an annual interest
rate of eight percent when the creditor's cost of funds is 4.5
percent per year. The expected profit from this loan is $350.'
Yet, let us assume that the debtor defaults and, after an addi-
tional year of collection efforts, $3,000 is recovered from the
debtor. The creditor's loss on the transaction would be
$7,920.25.2 Thus, a single default eliminates the profits gener-
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; S.B., Massachusetts Institute of
Technology; J.D., New York University. Preparation of this Article benefitted from
a Brooklyn Law School Summer Research Grant.
1. Assuming, for simplicity of illustration, that the creditor has no costs
(other than its cost of funds) associated with the loan, and that the loan is pay-
able in a single payment at the end of one year, the loan would generate $800 in
interest (8% of $10,000), but the creditor's cost of funds would be $450 (4.5% of
$10,000). The difference, then, between the interest charges and the cost of funds
is $350.
2. The creditor, in this case, has invested a total of $10,920.25 ($10,000 plus
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ated by a large number of fully performing extensions of credit.
Therefore, if the creditor believes that the risk of non-pay-
ment associated with a proposed extension of credit is too high,
that extension of credit will not take place because non-pay-
ment in the transaction would more than offset gains from
other transactions in which the debtors fully pay their debts.
Similarly, a creditor considering engaging in a particular class
of credit extensions will not do so if the risk associated with
individual extensions within that class exceeds a certain
threshold. Even if the chance that any one debtor will default
is relatively low, a small number of projected defaults will
yield a negative expected value for the entire class.
Such decisions not to extend credit are, obviously, unfortu-
nate for the debtors who are deprived of credit. They are also,
however, a source of disappointment for the prospective credi-
tors, for foregoing an extension of credit is foregoing a poten-
tially profit-making activity. Thus, both prospective debtors
and prospective creditors have incentives to seek ways to struc-
ture transactions so that the transactions can be profitable for
both parties.
Credit enhancement, generally speaking, is the art of
structuring a transaction, through economic agreements and
legal mechanisms, so that the transaction is seen by both the
creditor and the debtor as prospectively profitable. In other
words, the goal of credit enhancement is to minimize the
creditor's risk of loss due to non-performance while nonetheless
allowing the transaction to be profitable for the debtor.
In order to understand how credit enhancement can bring
about such a result,' one must first consider the situation of a
two years' interest at 4.5% compounded annually) and received only $3000, leaving
a loss of $7920.25.
3. I am tempted to describe this result as a win-win situation, but that de-
scription, while it would likely be accepted "in the field," is controversial in the
academic literature. There is a lively cottage industry devoted to debating whether,
for example, secured credit is truly efficient. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Security
Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGIS.
STUD. 1 (1981); Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND.
L. REV. 1051 (1984); Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86
COLUIMi. L. REV. 901 (1986); Paul Shupack, Solving the Puzzle of Secured Trans-
actions, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1067 (1989); James J. White, Efficiency Justifications
for Personal Property Security, 37 VAND. L. REV. 473 (1984). While other credit
enhancement mechanisms have not been analyzed so contentiously, the point can
probably be generalized.
[Vol. XXI:
DOMESTIC TRANSACTIONS
garden-variety creditor who has extended credit to a debtor
who does not voluntarily repay the debt. If the creditor is to
collect the debt, the creditor will have to both obtain a judg-
ment against the debtor and convert that judgment to money.
A number of obstacles will be encountered along the way to
achieving those steps. First, the debtor may deny the existence
of the debt or raise a defense to the obligation to repay it. Even
if the debtor's arguments do not ultimately prevail, the creditor
will have spent time and money responding to them. If they do
prevail, of course, the creditor will not obtain judgment against
the debtor or will obtain a judgment for a smaller amount.
Even if the creditor obtains a judgment against the debtor
for the full amount of the claim, the creditor is not assured of
recovery. A judgment does not automatically translate into
money. If the debtor voluntarily pays the judgment, the
creditor's claim will be satisfied. If, however, the debtor does
not pay voluntarily, the creditor faces several uncertainties.
While the legal system will provide the creditor with a poten-
tial claim against the debtor's assets, that claim may not be
easily reducible to money. For one thing, the debtor may not
have sufficient reachable assets to satisfy the creditor's claim.
Alternatively, while the debtor may have reachable assets
worth more than the claim, other creditors may be chasing
those same assets, resulting in insufficient assets to satisfy all
the claims and forcing various creditors to share the assets pro
rata. Perhaps one of the competing creditors already has a
judgment and a judicial lien against the assets. Similarly, the
debtor may have made some of those assets collateral for a
different debt owed to another party. In all these cases, the
judgment against the debtor will not provide the creditor with
the equivalent of repayment of the debt.
This article examines the law relating to credit enhance-
ment in the United States, focusing primarily on new develop-
ments. Part II discusses some forms of credit enhancement
structures. Parts III and IV analyze the current and develop-
ing law relating to such structures.
II. BASIC CREDIT ENHANCEMENT STRUCTURES
Credit enhancement devices, in a nutshell, are mecha-
nisms to ameliorate the creditor's risk of non-collection in
whole or in part. They do so by effectuating one or both of two
19961
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simple principles: making more assets reachable by the credi-
tor to satisfy the claim, or increasing the creditor's priority
with respect to assets available to it.
A. Enlarging the Asset Pool Available to the Creditor
As the amount of assets available to the creditor to satisfy
a judgment with respect to the debt increases, the ultimate
loss flowing from the debtor's default diminishes or is eliminat-
ed altogether. Increasing the amount of assets available to the
creditor can be accomplished by either assuring the availability
of the debtor's assets to satisfy the obligation, or by gaining
access to the assets of others to do so.
1. Increasing the Availability of the Debtor's Assets
The creditor is not entitled to reach the debtor's assets
merely because the creditor asserts that the debtor owes an
obligation to the creditor. Rather, in the absence of a security
interest (a credit enhancement device discussed later in this
article4) the creditor must first obtain a judgment against the
debtor. In many situations, there will be no doubt that the
creditor is entitled to a judgment. In a simple loan, for exam-
ple, it is usually conceded that the creditor has fully performed
its portion of the contract by lending the money and no longer
has any executory duties. All that must be demonstrated is
that the debtor has not repaid the loan. In most cases, the
creditor would be able to prevail by summary judgment with-
out the necessity of a trial. In other situations, though, the
creditor's right to a judgment may not be so clear. If, for exam-
ple, the original extension of credit was for goods sold or for
services rendered, the debtor might claim that the creditor's
performance never occurred (i.e., the goods were never deliv-
ered or the services were never performed) or that it did not
comply with the terms of the contract (i.e., the goods did not
live up to express or implied warranties, or the services did not
comply with the contractual specifications). If these allegations
were true, the debtor would have a defense to the creditor's
claim, or would have an offsetting claim in recoupment. At best
(from the creditor's perspective), the defense or offsetting claim
4. See infra part 1A.3.a.
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would be defeated at the summary judgment level or at trial.
It is possible, of course, that the creditor's claim would be de-
feated.
Thus, the ability of the creditor to obtain judgment against
the debtor quickly and simply is lessened by the ability of the
debtor to raise defenses and claims in recoupment. A creditor
could seek to structure its contract with the debtor so that the
debtor's obligation to pay the creditor is independent of any
defenses or claims in recoupment that the debtor may have
against the creditor. However, courts are typically hostile to
attempts, in a simple contract, to essentially strip a debtor of
its defenses in an action brought by the party whose conduct
created them.
Yet, there is a way to bring about this advantageous posi-
tion for the creditor, in part. This brings us to the first credit
enhancement mechanism that is the subject of this article -
the most basic of negotiable instruments, the note. Negotiable
instruments in general, and notes in particular, serve a variety
of commercial functions and are the subject of a relatively
complex statutory scheme that is, for the most part, beyond the
scope of this article. The central feature of negotiable instru-
ments, though, is the aspect that makes them useful as credit
enhancement mechanisms. That feature is the holder in due
course doctrine.
While a person entitled to enforce5 a note is normally sub-
ject to all defenses and claims in recoupment that could be
raised by the maker if the note were a simple contract,6 mat-
ters are very different if the person entitled to enforce the note
qualifies as a holder in due course. A holder in due course is
subject only to four "real defenses" of the maker: infancy (to
the extent that it qualifies as a defense to a simple contract);
duress, lack of capacity, or illegality that, under other law
would render the maker's obligation a nullity; fraud that in-
duced the maker to sign the note with neither knowledge nor
reasonable opportunity to learn its character or essential
terms; and discharge of the maker in insolvency proceedings!
Quite obviously, a holder in due course occupies a privileged
5. U.C.C. § 3-301 (1995) defines "person entitled to enforce" a note as includ-
ing primarily, the holder of the note.
6. Id. § 3-305(a).
7. Id. § 3-305(a)(1), (b).
1996]
BROOK. J. INTL L.
position. In most cases, though, the payee of a note will not
qualify as a holder in due course if the maker has any defens-
es.' Thus, the holder in due course doctrine operates primarily
to separate a maker's duty to pay the holder in due course
from any defenses or claims in recoupment that the debtor
may have. Those defenses and claims in recoupment are not
lost by the maker since they may be raised in a separate action
against the payee who created them. They cannot, however, be
raised against the holder in due course as a defense to an
action on the note.
At one level, the note does not seem to be a credit en-
hancement mechanism. Indeed, strictly speaking, it may not be
one. After all, the ability of the original creditor (as payee of
the note) to obtain judgment against the debtor (as maker of
the note) is not greater than if the creditor's claim were on a
simple contract.9 If, however, the original creditor negotiates
the instrument to a person who qualifies as a holder in due
course, that transferee, as a holder in due course, will take free
of all but the debtor's real defenses." Thus, while the use of a
negotiable instrument does not give the creditor as payee an
enhanced opportunity to obtain a judgment against the debtor
as maker and, accordingly, access to the debtor's assets, struc-
turing the debt in the form of a note makes the creditor's claim
against the debtor marketable to someone who will have that
enhanced opportunity. Since the value of the claim against the
debtor in the hands of a holder in due course is greater than
the value of that claim in the hands of the original creditor,
the creditor has the opportunity to sell that claim to a person
who would qualify as a holder in due course and thereby reap
some of the benefits of the enhanced value.
8. Most often, this will be the case because the payee will not have taken
the instrument for "value" (as defined in U.C.C. § 3-303 (1995)) if the payee's
performance gives the maker a defense to its payment obligation or a claim in
recoupment. Taking the instrument for value is one of the prerequisites for quali-
fying as a holder in due course. Id. § 3-302(a)(2)(i).
9. This assumes, as will almost always be the case, that the payee against
whom the maker has defenses does not qualify as a holder in due course. See
supra note 8.
10. U.C.C. §§ 3-203(b), 3-305(b) (1995).
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2. Gaining Access to the Assets of Third Parties
Credit enhancement devices that increase the probability
of the creditor (or its assignee) obtaining judgment against the
debtor and thereby gaining access to the debtor's assets have
significant value to the creditor, though, only if the debtor has
sufficient assets to satisfy the debt in light of the competing
claims against the debtor. In most cases, however, that is the
very risk against which the creditor is trying to protect. Thus,
much more important as credit enhancement devices are mech-
anisms that either make additional assets available to the
creditor (those of third parties) or increase the creditor's priori-
ty of access with respect to the debtor's assets so that the cred-
itor is more likely to obtain satisfaction from them. First, this
paper examines those mechanisms providing the creditor with
access to the assets of third parties.
a. Third Party as Co-Obligor
One common way for the creditor to obtain access to the
assets of a third party with respect to credit extended to the
debtor is for the debtor to provide another, more creditworthy
person to be an obligor along with the debtor. Once the more
creditworthy person (for convenience, let us call this helpful
person "the enhancer") is identified, it is simple to structure
the transaction so that the enhancer is co-obligated with the
debtor. The enhancer can simply be a cosigner (with the debt-
or) of the loan agreement or other contract creating the
debtor's obligation. Alternatively, if the debt is evidenced by a
negotiable instrument, the enhancer can be a comaker with the
debtor. In either case, the enhancer would be jointly and sever-
ally liable with the debtor and could thus be sued without the
necessity of first suing the debtor or otherwise trying to collect
from the debtor. By making the enhancer a co-obligor, the
creditor has gained access to the enhancer's assets to satisfy
the debt created by the extension of credit to the debtor.
b. Third Party Liability upon Default
Another way to structure an extension of credit so that the
creditor can gain access to the assets of the enhancer is for the
parties to agree that the enhancer is liable if (but not until)
the debtor defaults on its obligation. This can be accomplished
1996]
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either in the same contract pursuant to which the debtor
agrees to pay the debt in question, or in a separate contract
between the enhancer and the creditor. Obligations of this sort
are typically known as "guaranties."
Guaranty agreements can take a variety of forms and have
a variety of terms. Most often, such agreements are guaranties
of payment. The guarantor agrees that if the debtor does not
pay the debt when it is due, the creditor may call upon the
guarantor to perform. In a guaranty of payment, the creditor
need not first pursue (or sue) the debtor.
Other guaranties, however, occasionally take the form of a
"guaranty of collection." In a guaranty of collection, the guar-
antor agrees that it will pay the debt only after the debtor's
failure to pay and the creditor's failure (or presumed failure) to
obtain satisfaction from the debtor through legal means. One
authority describes the typical guaranty of collection as one in
which the guarantor agrees to perform if (and only if):
(1) execution of judgment against the [debtor] has been
returned unsatisfied; or
(2) the [debtor] is insolvent or in an insolvency proceeding;
or
(3) the [debtor] cannot be served with process; or
(4) it is otherwise apparent that payment cannot be ob-
tained from the [debtor]."
In both the guaranty of payment and the guaranty of col-
lection, the guarantor's obligation is created by simple contract
that may either be separate from the contract creating the debt
or part of that contract. If, however, the debt is evidenced by a
negotiable instrument such as a note, matters are more com-
plicated. The guarantor may incur its liability by entering into
a separate contract with the creditor, or the guarantor may
incur its liability by agreeing to equivalent liability on the
instrument. For example, a person who indorses a note agrees
that if the note is dishonored, he or she will pay the amount of
the note to the person entitled to enforce it. Thus, an indorser
incurs a liability with respect to the debt evidenced by the note
that is functionally identical to entering into a separate guar-
anty with respect to that debt. Of course, most often, the moti-
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 15(b)
(forthcoming 1996) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY].
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vation behind indorsement of a negotiable instrument is not to
provide credit enhancement for the payee but, rather, to effec-
tuate negotiation of the instrument. In cases where the in-
dorsement functions as a credit enhancement, the indorsement
is often known as an "accommodation indorsement."
12
c. Third Party Liability for Loss
Still another way to structure an extension of credit so
that the creditor can gain access to the assets of the enhancer
is for the parties to agree that the enhancer will be liable for
any loss suffered by the creditor as a result of the failure of the
debtor to pay its debt. This agreement might take the form of a
warranty by the enhancer that the debtor will pay its debt to
the creditor when it is due. If the warranty is breached by the
debtor's failure to pay its debt, the enhancer would be liable
for the damages that flow from that failure. Typically, the
damages will be equal to the unpaid sum. Using such a war-
ranty as a credit enhancement device thus gives the creditor
access to the assets of the enhancer in the event of the debtor's
default.
d. Third Party Repurchase Agreements
A different mechanism by which the assets of the enhancer
can be made available to the creditor is through the use of an
agreement pursuant to which the enhancer agrees that, in the
event the debtor defaults on its payment obligation, the
enhancer will purchase the creditor's claim against the debtor
for a specified sum (such as, for example, the unpaid indebted-
ness). By use of such an agreement, the creditor has two par-
ties from whom it may recover, and, therefore, two parties
whose assets are reachable. The creditor may pursue the debt-
or on the debt or, if the debtor does not pay the debt, the credi-
tor may call upon the enhancer to purchase the claim. Failure
of the debtor to pay the debt will give rise to a cause of action
against the debtor and, upon judgment, access to its assets;
failure of the enhancer to purchase the claim upon the debtor's
default, on the other hand, will give rise to a cause of action
against the enhancer and, upon judgment, access to its assets.
12. U.C.C. § 3-419 (1995).
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If the enhancer does purchase the claim from the creditor, the
claim is not extinguished or satisfied, of course-it merely has
a new owner. But, from the perspective of the creditor, it is as
though the claim has been satisfied. Whether the debtor satis-
fies the claim by performing or the enhancer satisfies its obli-
gation by purchasing the claim against the debtor, in either
event the creditor ends up with cash in the amount of its claim
and no longer owning a claim against either party.
e. Issuance by Third Party of a Letter of Credit
One other credit enhancement mechanism by which the
creditor can gain access to the debts of another must be high-
lighted. That mechanism is the letter of credit. Often in a sale
of goods transaction, the seller is unwilling to rely on the buyer
to pay for the goods when they are accepted, but the buyer is
unwilling to pay for the goods in advance. One commonly used
solution for this conundrum is the documentary letter of credit.
The buyer of goods procures such a letter of credit from a bank
satisfactory to the seller, with the issuer's payment obligation
conditioned on tender to it of a specified document or docu-
ments (such as, for example, a bill of lading indicating that the
goods have been shipped and a certificate of inspection of the
goods by an independent inspector). When the seller tenders
the issuer documents conforming to the terms of the letter of
credit, the issuer is obliged to pay the letter of credit (and is
entitled to reimbursement from its customer).13 Thus, a seller
who fulfills the conditions of the letter of credit has a party
from whom it can obtain payment who, almost certainly, has
greater assets than the buyer-the issuer of the letter of cred-
it. 14
An important variant of the documentary letter of credit is
the so-called "standby letter of credit." A standby credit is the
legal equivalent of a documentary credit, but in a standby
13. U.C.C. § 5-114(3) (1994).
14. It must be emphasized that the issuer's obligation on the letter of credit
is independent of that of the buyer on the sale of goods contract. So long as the
conditions of the letter of credit are fulfilled, the seller/beneficiary is entitled to
payment even if the buyer has a defense or claim against the seller on the sales
contract. See id. § 5-114(1). Of course, if the issuer pays the letter of credit it is
entitled to reimbursement from the applicant. See supra text accompanying note
13. Thus, the independence principle, like the holder in due course doctrine, works
to separate the buyer's duty to pay from any defenses it might have.
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credit the document that must be tendered to the issuer to
trigger the issuer's payment obligation is a certificate by the
beneficiary of the letter of credit that the applicant has not
fulfilled a specified payment obligation. Standby letters of
credit are denominated as such because unlike transactions
utilizing traditional documentary letters of credit, in which it
is anticipated that the beneficiary will be paid by drawing on
the credit, they are issued to be drawn on only if the debt-
or/applicant fails to pay its debt in accordance with the con-
tract that created it.
Thus, the use of a letter of credit provides the creditor
with recourse against the assets of two parties. The creditor, of
course, has access to the assets of the debtor by virtue of the
underlying claim against the debtor. In addition, the creditor
has access to the assets of the issuer of the letter of credit
because of its claim against the issuer under letter of credit
law.
f. Hypothecation Agreements by Third Parties
The previously described mechanisms by which a creditor
can gain access to the assets of another to satisfy the indebted-
ness owed by the debtor all involve contractual arrangements
whereby the enhancer is made personally liable and, therefore,
subject to judgment and execution upon that judgment general-
ly against his or her assets. It is also possible, though, for the
parties to arrange matters so that only certain assets of the
enhancer are available to satisfy the claim against the debtor.
This can be accomplished by an agreement, often called a hy-
pothecation agreement, pursuant to which the enhancer grants
a security interest in specific items of its property to secure the
obligation of the debtor to the creditor. In this way, the assets
of the enhancer are not generally available to the creditor;
rather, only the particular assets in which the security interest
was granted can be reached.
3. Increasing the Creditor's Priority with Respect to Assets
Subject to the Creditor's Claim
The third major category of credit enhancement devices
are those that increase the creditor's likelihood of payment, not
by increasing the amount of assets to which the creditor may
have access but, rather, by increasing the creditor's priority
1996]
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with respect to access to those assets. In other words, these
devices enable the assets subject to the creditor's claim to be
applied to that claim prior to subjecting them to the claims of
others.
a. Security Interests
When a debtor grants a creditor a security interest in
some of the debtor's property, the debtor is, essentially, agree-
ing that if the debtor defaults, the creditor will be entitled to
seize that property, sell it, and use the proceeds to satisfy the
debt. When the grant of the security interest is effectuated
properly, it is effective not only between the debtor and credi-
tor but also against third parties. 5 Most third parties who
obtain an interest in the property thereafter will be subordi-
nate to the rights of the creditor. 6 When a debtor grants a
creditor a security interest in some of the debtor's property,
nothing is added to the set of property to which the creditor
will have recourse in the event that the debtor defaults and
the creditor obtains judgment; after judgment, the creditor
could'have obtained a lien against that property. Rather, the
advantage of a security interest is that the creditor will not
have to share the proceeds of that property with other credi-
tors. By use of the security interest, the creditor has increased
its priority with respect to assets that were available to it in
the event of default.
A security interest may be granted to secure any obliga-
tion. Accordingly, not only can the debtor grant a security
interest securing its obligation to repay the extension of credit,
but a guarantor or other credit enhancer may also grant a
security interest in its property to secure its obligation to the
debtor. In such a case, the creditor has not only increased the
set of assets to which it has access (by bringing in the assets of
the enhancer) but also has raised its priority with respect to
the additional assets.
15. U.C.C. § 9-201 (1995).
16. Priority rules are beyond the scope of this paper, but it can be noted that
the bulk of such rules are of the first-in-time, first-in-right variety. See id. § 9-
312(5).
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b. Subordination Agreements
A creditor can also increase its priority with respect to
assets reachable by judgment through the use of subordination
agreements. In brief, a subordination agreement is an agree-
ment by one creditor that it is not entitled to satisfaction with
respect to a particular claim (or group of claims) against the
debtor until after certain claims against that debtor by another
creditor or creditors have been satisfied. Thus, if one creditor
can induce another creditor to subordinate the latter's claims
against the debtor to those of the former creditor, the former
creditor will have increased its priority of access to the assets
of the debtor.
III. GOVERNNG LAw
The credit enhancement mechanisms described above are
governed by a variety of legal regimes. To understand these
mechanisms, and the changes in the law governing them, it is
important to first identify those regimes.
A. Contract Law
The credit enhancement mechanisms described in this
paper are the product of consensual agreements reached be-
tween or among some combination of the debtor, the creditor,
and a third party whose assets are made either partially or
wholly reachable to satisfy the debt. Thus, not surprisingly, all
of these devices are, at least to some extent, governed by the
general law of contracts. Indeed, for some devices, such as
subordination agreements, the general law of contracts pro-
vides essentially all of the governing law. For most of the de-
vices, however, contract law is supplemented (and sometimes
supplanted) by more particularized legal doctrines.
B. Uniform Commercial Code Article 3
As described above,1 the use of a negotiable instrument
is, by itself, a credit enhancement device. Rights and duties of
parties to negotiable instruments are governed by Article 3 of
the Uniform Commercial Code. Whenever the debtor's obliga-
17. See supra part II.A.1.
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tion to the creditor is evidenced by a note, the debtor's obliga-
tions (and the creditor's rights against the debtor) are governed
by Article 3. Article 3 tells us whether a particular assignee
qualifies as a holder in due course 8 and, if so, what defenses
the debtor cannot raise against that holder in due course. 9
Whether an additional credit enhancement device used in
conjunction with a debt evidenced by a note is governed by
Article 3, though, is a more complicated question.
If, in addition to the use of a negotiable instrument as a
credit enhancement device, the creditor has gained access to
the assets of a third party as a result of that third party be-
coming a co-maker or accommodation indorser of the note,
Article 3 also governs the rights of the third party as against
the co-maker or accommodation indorser." Because the co-
maker or indorser qualifies as an accommodation party,2' Ar-
ticle 3 provides two layers of rules. First, the accommodation
party is liable in the capacity in which it signed the instru-
ment. Thus, a comaker has all of the obligations of a maker of
a note under the rules governing makers' obligations, and an
accommodation indorser has all of the obligations of an indors-
er under the rules governing indorsers. Second, because accom-
modation parties incur an obligation without being the direct
beneficiary of the value (the extension of credit) for which the
obligation was incurred, negotiable instruments law provides
accommodation parties with special defenses to liability that
are not generally available to makers and indorsers.22 These
defenses, which parallel the defenses provided to secondary
obligors in the general law of suretyship and guaranty, relieve
accommodation parties of some or all of their obligation when
the holder of the instrument has taken certain actions that
interfere with the accommodation parties' rights.
C. Suretyship and Guaranty Law
Part II.A.2 of this article catalogs a number of mechanisms
which provide the creditor with a claim against the enhancer,
thereby subjecting the enhancer's assets to satisfaction of a
18. See U.C.C. § 3-302 (1995).
19. Id. § 3-305(b).
20. See id. §§ 3-305, 3-419, 3-605.
21. See id. § 3-419.
22. See id. § 3-605.
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judgment with respect to the extension of credit. As noted
above, when the enhancer becomes a party to a negotiable
instrument, the law governing the enhancer's rights and duties
is Uniform Commercial Code Article 3. As noted below, when
the enhancer is the issuer of a letter of credit, its rights and
duties are governed by the law unique to that mechanism. In
almost every other case in which the enhancer contracts either
to be liable generally with respect to the debtor's obligation or
to make certain items of its property collateral for that obliga-
tion, the rights and duties of the third party are governed not
only by the general law of contracts, but also by its more spe-
cific offspring, the law of suretyship and guaranty.
D. Letter of Credit Law
When the enhancer is the issuer of a letter of credit, the
rights and duties of the enhancer are governed by letter of
credit law. Formally, most letter of credit law is found in Arti-
cle 5 of the Uniform Commercial Code. A significant proportion
of letters of credit, though, incorporate by reference a set of
rules that are not, strictly speaking, law, but, by their frequen-
cy of incorporation, have attained a law-like status. This set of
rules is the Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary
Credits (UCP), promulgated by the International Chamber of
Commerce.'
E. Uniform Commercial Code Article 9
The second major category of credit enhancement devices
are those that increase the creditor's priority with respect to
assets already reachable by judgment by giving the creditor a
security interest in the debtor's assets or the assets of the
enhancer. With few exceptions, when the security interest is in
personal property of the debtor, the rights concerning that
security interest are governed by Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. Article 9, of course, also governs security inter-
ests that are granted pursuant to a hypothecation agreement
by an enhancer who is not otherwise assuming responsibility
for the debt.
23. INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PUB. No. 500, UNIFORM CUSTOMS
AND PRACTICE FOR DocUMENTARY CREDITS (1993).
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F. Mortgage Law
While in many cases the assets that are the subject of a
security interest constitute personal property within the pur-
view of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, in other
transactions the property that is the subject of the security
interest is real property. Security interests in real property are
typically referred to as mortgages, and the law governing mort-
gages is an important division of real property law.
IV. NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN GOVERNING LAW
The domestic law governing credit enhancement devices is
in the midst of a process of renewal and revision that rivals
the legal revolution that accompanied the development of the
Uniform Commercial Code a half-century ago. Almost every
body of American law governing credit enhancement devices
has either just completed, or is in the process of, major revision
or rethinking. The remainder of this article surveys these new
developments.
A. Revised Uniform Commercial Code Article 3
As noted above, Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code
provides the law governing the debtor's obligation when that
obligation is evidenced by a negotiable instrument. Thus, it is
Article 3 that provides the governing law for negotiability-the
credit enhancement device that allows certain assignees from
the original creditor to enforce the claim against the debtor
without regard to most defenses of the debtor or to claims in
recoupment. Article 3 also provides the law governing the
rights and duties of accommodation parties-third parties who
become liable with respect to the debtor's obligation, thereby
making their assets reachable to satisfy that claim, by becom-
ing parties to the same negotiable instrument.
Uniform Commercial Code Article 3 was substantially
revised and rewritten just a few years ago. In 1990, the Ameri-
can Law Institute and the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws (the co-proprietors of the Uniform
Commercial Code) promulgated revised Article 3, representing
the first major revision of an article of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code in over a decade. These revisions, now adopted in
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over 40 states,2 4 made small but important changes in the
criteria that must be fulfilled for a holder to qualify for holder
in due course status, and made major changes in the rules
governing accommodation parties. Inasmuch as the effect of
the revised article is prospective only, its impact is only now
beginning to be felt.
1. Holder in Due Course
A small but important change in the rules governing at-
tainment of holder in due course status was brought about by
a change in the definition of "good faith" as that term is used
in Uniform Commercial Code Article 3. To qualify as a holder
in due course, a holder must take the note, inter alia, for value
and in good faith. Previous Article 3 relied on the general Uni-
form Commercial Code definition of good faith-honesty in fact
in the conduct or transaction.' Revised Article 3, on the other
hand, contains its own definition of good faith that is applica-
ble throughout the Article and, thus, to the definition of holder
in due course. Revised Article 3 provides that good faith
"means honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable com-
mercial standards of fair dealing."' Thus, a person who is
subjectively honest, but does not fulfill the more objective test
of the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing, would have qualified for holder in due course status in
the original version of Article 3 but does not under the revised
text.
2. Accommodation Parties
As noted above, Uniform Commercial Code Article 3 also
governs the rights and duties of accommodation parties. The
changes made in the rules governing these rights and duties
were among the most significant changes in the new Article 3.
An accommodation party may be a comaker, in which case
its liability (from the perspective of the holder) is joint and
several with the debtor, or an indorser, in which case the ac-
commodation party is liable upon dishonor of the note (i.e.,
24. As of this writing, New York is perhaps the most notable exception.
25. U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1995).
26. Id. § 3-103(a)(4).
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default by the debtor).' In both cases, the accommodation
party's rights and obligations differ from those of ordinary,
garden-variety makers and indorsers because of the application
of special rules derived from suretyship law that are designed
to protect the accommodation party's interests.
The rules governing accommodation parties have been
completely rewritten in the new article. Most important, the
rules governing "suretyship defenses," which in original Article
3 were essentially rigid calcifications of old suretyship rules,
were completely restructured.
In the original Article 3, as in much of the case law exist-
ing prior to the adoption of that Article, any change in the
obligation of the debtor/accommodated party (such as an exten-
sion of the due date of the note, modification of its terms, or
release of liability) that was not consented to by the accommo-
dation party automatically resulted in complete discharge of
the accommodation party from its obligation on the note.'
This was the case even in situations in which the change in
the debtor's obligation was for the purpose of enabling the
creditor to collect more money, rather than less, from the debt-
or (such as an extension of time that enables the debtor to
reorganize its financial affairs and obtain the funds necessary
to pay the note), or if the change could not possibly harm the
accommodation party (such as a changes that lowers the inter-
est rate on the debt evidenced by the note). Thus, application
of this rule of absolute discharge often resulted in windfalls for
accommodation parties; the benefit they received from dis-
charge was greater than the harm they would have suffered
from the change in the underlying transaction. Such accommo-
dation parties were put in a better position by the changed
transaction and accompanying discharge than if no change had
been made at all.
The original Article 3 also embraced two doctrines from
the old common law of suretyship and guaranty that somewhat
ameliorated the effect of these absolute discharge rules. First,
the Article codified the so-called "reservation of rights" doc-
trine. That doctrine allowed the creditor/holder to avoid what
would otherwise be the automatic discharge of the accommoda-
27. Id. § 3-419.
28. U.C.C. § 3-606(1) (1989).
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tion party that would accompany a change in the debtor's obli-
gation (such as an extension of time to pay) simply by intoning
to the debtor, at the time the change was agreed to, a
talismanic phrase such as "but I reserve all my rights against
the accommodation party." Second, the original Article 3,
like the common law, provided for the ability of the accommo-
dation party to consent (either at the time or in advance) to
changes in the debtor's obligation. The obligations of the ac-
commodation party were not automatically discharged by
changes to which it had consented."
Revised Article 3, on the other hand, moves away from a
doctrine that generates windfall effects as remedies for acts of
questionable harm, and moves instead in the direction of mod-
ern contract law (and perhaps Gilbert and Sullivan)3' by, with
one major exception, fitting the punishment to the crime. Un-
der revised Article 3, if the creditor agrees to give the debtor
an extension of time to pay, or agrees to any other modification
of the debtor's duty, the accommodation party may be dis-
charged, but only to the extent that the extension or modifica-
tion harms the accommodation party.32 In other words, if, but
for the extension or modification, the accommodation party
would have ended up paying less (or recovering more from the
debtor), then, to the extent of that harm and only to that extent,
the accommodation party will be discharged.
The exception referred to above has to do with the rela-
tively uncommon context of a release of the debtor. In that
case, revised Article 3 is diametrically opposed to its predeces-
sor. Original Article 3 would grant a total discharge to the
accommodation party if the creditor released the debt-
or/accommodated party.33 Revised Article 3, on the other
hand, states that the accommodation party is never discharged
29. Id. § 3-606(2).
30. Id. § 3-606(1).
31. The concept-of having the punishment fit the crime-was stated by Gil-
bert and Sullivan in The Mikado:
My object all sublime
I shall achieve in time -
To let the Punishment fit the crime -
The punishment fit the crime.
W.S. Gilbert & Arthur Sullivan, The Mikado, in THE COMPLETE PLAYS OF GILBERT
& SULLIVAN 343, 352 (Jerome Robinson ed., 1938).
32. U.C.C. § 3-605(c)-(d) (1995).
33. U.C.C. § 3-601(3)(b) (1989).
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by such a release.34 Having ameliorated at least some of the
potential windfalls to accommodation parties that were endem-
ic to the old rules by eliminating the automatic discharges, the
new Article largely abrogates the reservation of rights doctrine,
which no longer serves a needed purpose. The new Article
does, however, continue to allow the accommodation party to
consent to actions that would otherwise be the basis for dis-
charge. Indeed, those rules are augmented by a provision that
makes it clear that there will be no discharge from any such
actions if the accommodation party simply states (in the note
or otherwise) that it "waives all defenses based on suretyship
or impairment of collateral."
B. Restatement of Suretyship and Guaranty
At its May 1995 annual meeting, the membership of the
American Law Institute gave final approval to the promulga-
tion of the Restatement of the Law of Suretyship and Guaran-
ty (New Restatement). The New Restatement replaces Divi-
sion 2 (Suretyship) of the 1941 Restatement of Security." The
New Restatement takes an area of the law often marked (as in
the case of original Uniform Commercial Code Article 3) by the
unthinking application of rigid doctrines and slogans masquer-
ading as concepts and tries to bring it into the modem era of
contract and commercial law.
1. Scope
Like Uniform Commercial Code Article 9, the New Re-
statement takes a functional approach to its coverage. The
substance of transactions, rather than their form, is determi-
native. The New Restatement governs whenever a third party
(i) owes the creditor performance of the debtor's obligation, (ii)
has another duty to the creditor which is triggered by the
debtor's default, performance of which satisfies the debtor's
obligation to the creditor, or (iii) can be forced to buy the
creditor's rights against the debtor. Given the wide variety of
34. U.C.C. § 3-605(b) (1995).
35. Id. § 3-605(i).
36. RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY, supra note 11.
37. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF SECURITY (1941) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT
OF SECURITY].
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labels frequently given to varied transactions that can fit with-
in this description, the New Restatement uses generic termi-
nology to avoid misunderstandings that might otherwise result
from the use of labels traditionally associated with some, but
not all, of these transactions. Accordingly, the party referred to
in this paper as the "debtor" is known in the New Restatement
as the "principal obligor;"' the obligation owed by the princi-
pal obligor is the "underlying obligation,"' and that obligation
is owed to the "obligee."" The third party who owes perfor-
mance of that obligation or another obligation performance of
which will satisfy the underlying obligation is the "secondary
obligor,"' and its obligation is the "secondary obligation." 2
2. Contract Formation and Interpretation
It is a commonplace maxim that "a surety is the favorite of
the law." The maxim, which carries no hint of exactly what
that favoritism is, is often invoked reflexively and without
critical analysis to justify almost any decision or rule that
favors a secondary obligor. In particular, the maxim has been
frequently (and, in my view, incorrectly) used to justify con-
struing a contract in the most advantageous way possible from
the perspective of the secondary obligor. The New Restatement
makes it clear that while there are several substantive rules of
suretyship and guaranty law that give secondary obligors bene-
fits not generally available to parties to ordinary contracts,
normal rules of contract formation and interpretation apply to
secondary obligations. No special solicitude to secondary
obligors is called for in determining to what the parties agreed.
3. Misrepresentation, Fraud, and Non-Disclosure
The suretyship provisions in the old Restatement of Secu-
rity, building on contract law principles, provided that fraudu-
lent or material misrepresentation can void the secondary
obligation.43 The New Restatement builds on this principle,
38. RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY, supra note 11, § 1(1)(a).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY, supra note 37, § 113.
19961
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
casting it in the light of modem contract theory. Importantly,
it provides that non-disclosure of facts materially affecting risk
to the secondary obligor can sometimes constitute misrepresen-
tation.4 Thus, unlike the case in general contract law, ad-
verse consequences may flow from the failure to disclose cer-
tain facts to the secondary obligor.
4. Secondary Obligor's Rights against Principal Obligor
As between the principal obligor and the secondary obli-
gor, it is, of course, the principal obligor who should bear the
cost of performing the obligation owed to the obligee. Histori-
cally, suretyship law provided a secondary obligor who per-
forms its obligation a right of reimbursement against the prin-
cipal obligor and, in appropriate circumstances, a right to be
subrogated to the obligee's rights against the principal obligor.
In addition, a secondary obligor called upon to perform when
the principal obligor was capable of doing so was provided a
remedy very much like specific performance known as "exoner-
ation. 4
5
The New Restatement more carefully articulates these
rights of the secondary obligor to be made whole or kept whole.
The right of reimbursement is divided into two complementary
provisions governing reimbursement and restitution. Rules
governing the right of subrogation have been expanded and
clarified. Finally, and most dramatically, the New Restatement
reformulates the right of exoneration and its cousin, the pre-
emptive first strike known as quia timet.46 Rather than artic-
ulating those methods of keeping the secondary obligor whole
as procedural rights in themselves, the New Restatement in-
stead articulates a substantive duty on the part of the princi-
pal obligor to: (i) perform the underlying obligation so that the
secondary obligor will not have to perform the secondary obli-
gation; and (ii) not to impair the secondary obligor's expecta-
tion that the principal obligor will perform." The New Re-
44. RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY, supra note 11, § 12(3).
45. See RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY, supra note 37, § 112.
46. See, e.g., Borey v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 30 (2d Cir.
1991); see also RESTATMENT OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY, supra note 11, § 21
cmt. i and sources cited therein.
47. See generally RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY, supra note 11,
§ 21.
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statement then reconfigures exoneration and quia timet as
possible remedies for the violation of these newly articulated
duties.
5. Set-Offs
Because suretyship and guaranty transactions are, at the
least, three-cornered relationships, matters get very complicat-
ed when obligations flowing between two of the three parties
are asserted in such a way as to affect the third party. Most
often, this arises when one party seeks to set off against per-
formance it owes to another party either an obligation owed to
it by the third party or an obligation owed to the third party
by the second party. For example, assume that a secondary
obligor who is called upon to perform has a claim of its own
against the obligee. May the secondary obligor set off that
independent claim against its duty on the secondary obliga-
tion? Alternatively, assume that the principal obligor has a
claim against the obligee that is unrelated to the suretyship
transaction. May the secondary obligor raise that claim of the
principal obligor as a set-off against the secondary obligor's
duty? The answers to questions such as these are not simple,
and the questions have proven difficult for practitioners and
courts. The New Restatement provides significant guidance in
this area.4"
6. Suretyship Defenses
One of the most significant developments in the New Re-
statement is its treatment of the law governing suretyship
defenses. As indicated in the discussion of revised Uniform
Commercial Code Article 3,49 one of the most problematic ar-
eas of suretyship and guaranty law has been the determination
of the effect to be given to acts by the obligee that impact upon
the duties of the principal obligor for which the secondary
obligor is also responsible. Traditionally, any change in the
principal obligor's obligation to the obligee resulted in auto-
matic discharge of the secondary obligor. By the time that the
Restatement of Security was approved over a half-century ago,
48. See id. §§ 31, 35, 36.
49. See supra part IV.A.
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though, it was recognized that this rule often gave windfall
benefits where there was little or no harm. Thus, that Restate-
ment adopted a set of rules that ameliorated this harshness
somewhat," although the core of the doctrine was left un-
changed.
In the fifty years between the approval of the old Restate-
ment and the commencement of work on the New Restate-
ment, the biggest advance in the law governing suretyship de-
fenses came in the 1990 adoption of revised Uniform Commer-
cial Code Article V'51 That Article, as described above, rejected
the absolute discharge theory of suretyship defenses and re-
placed it with a loss prevention model. That advance, while
accomplished in an occasionally quirky and internally inconsis-
tent way,52 paved the way for a more general application of
that principle. Accordingly, the New Restatement adopts the
principle that, for all "impairments of recourse," the secondary
obligor is discharged from its obligation only to the extent that
the secondary obligor would otherwise suffer a loss as result of
the impairment.13 Situations where loss might otherwise oc-
cur include cases in which a solvent principal obligor has been
granted a release of its duties pursuant to the underlying obli-
gation by the obligee, 4 where a principal obligor's financial
situation worsened during the period of an extension,55 and
modifications that make the obligation more burdensome for
the secondary obligor to fulfill."
7. Multiple Surety Transactions
Credit enhancement devices can be quite complex even
when there is only one credit enhancer. The possible combina-
tions and permutations of relationships between the debtor,
50. See RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY, supra note 37, § 128.
51. See supra part IVA.
52. See Neil B. Cohen, Suretyship Principles in the New Article 3: Clarifica-
tions and Substantive Changes, 42 ALA. L. REV. 595, 597 (1990); see also PEB
COMMENTARY No. 11, FINAL DRAFT, SURETYSHIP ISSUES UNDER SECTIONs 3-116, 3-
305, 3415, 3-419, AND 3-605 (Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 1994).
53. See RESTATEMENT OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY, supra note 11, §§ 37,
39-44.
54. See generally id. § 39.
55. See generally id. § 40.
56. See generally id. § 41.
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the creditor, and the enhancer can, as we have seen, present
some knotty problems. When there is more than one enhancer
in the same transaction, the complications seem to increase
geometrically.
Multiple surety transactions are those in which there is
more than one secondary obligor. In such cases, the nature of
the legal relationships that are created depends on the nature
of the relationship between the secondary obligors. Cases in
which the secondary obligors qualify as "cosureties"'7 present
different legal implications than those in which the secondary
obligors have a relationship of "principal surety" and
"subsurety."8 In a cosurety situation, the secondary obligors
are on equal, or at least parallel, footing, and the structure of
rights and remedies that runs through a cosurety transaction
is designed to effectuate that status by having the cosureties
share the cost of performance. For example, when one cosurety
performs the entire obligation, suretyship law provides that
cosurety with a right of contribution against the other cosurety
so that each will, ultimately, bear only its "contributive share"
of the performance. In a principal surety-subsurety situation,
on the other hand, the relationship between the secondary
obligors is such that it is the principal surety that should bear
the total cost of performance. Thus, if the subsurety is called
upon by the obligee to perform, it has a right of reimbursement
for the full amount of that performance against the principal
surety; conversely, if the principal surety performs, it has no
action against the subsurety.
Not surprisingly, courts have often had great difficulty
sorting through the issues created by multiple surety transac-
tions. Moreover, the doctrines that distinguish cosuretyship
situations from subsuretyship situations have often shed little
light, and rules within those situations (such as those used to
determine the contributive shares of each cosurety) have often
been plagued with logical inconsistency and practical difficulty.
The New Restatement brings some order to this complex area
by explicitly articulating a framework of rules and making it
clear how those rules derive from, and fit into, the relatively
simpler cases in which there is only one secondary obligor.
57. See generally id. §§ 51, 55-58.
58. See generally id. §§ 51, 59-61.
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8. Summary
Will the New Restatement have a significant impact on
this important credit enhancement device? It is probably too
early to tell. The imprimatur of the American Law Institute
carries quite a bit of weight, but Restatements are not self-
executing (except in the U.S. Virgin Islands). Rather, Re-
statement rules become the law only by adoption by the courts.
Ultimately, therefore, the impact of the New Restatement will
be determined by its own persuasiveness.
C. Revised Uniform Commercial Code Article 5
Revised Uniform Commercial Code Article 5, governing
letters of credit, received final approval in 1995 from both the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
and the American Law Institute, the two proprietors of the
Uniform Commercial Code. While a detailed analysis of the
provisions of those revisions is beyond the scope of this article,
one aspect of the revisions is particularly worthy of attention.
While both letters of credit and secondary obligations gov-
erned by the law of suretyship and guaranty are credit en-
hancement devices, they are distinct legal specialties. A letter
of credit, even a standby letter of credit, is not a secondary
obligation. Nonetheless, letter of credit issuers have occasional-
ly sought to invoke the law governing secondary obligations.
Most often, this occurs when an issuer of a standby letter of
credit has sought to become subrogated to the rights of the
beneficiary of the letter of credit against the issuer's customer.
Normally, there would be no need for this sort of subrogation.
After all, the issuer already has a reimbursement claim
against its customer. Yet, in some circumstances, piggy-back-
ing on the beneficiary's claim against the customer might be
advantageous, which is particularly the case when the issuer's
reimbursement claim is not secured by collateral, but the
beneficiary's claim is secured. If the customer is insolvent, the
difference between asserting a secured claim and an unsecured
claim may be the difference between full recovery and little or
no recovery. Similarly, if the reimbursement claim is
undersecured, but the beneficiary's claim is secured by other
collateral, access to that other collateral can keep the issuer
from suffering a loss.
Issuers seeking subrogation to the rights of beneficiaries
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have generally faced hostility from the courts.59 Much of this
hostility stems from the efforts of the drafters of original Uni-
form Commercial Code Article 5 to erect firm barriers between
the law of guaranties and the law governing letters of credit,
primarily to assure the efficacy of the independence principle
of letters of credit. Emblematic of these barriers is the asser-
tion in the Official Comment to original Uniform Commercial
Code section 5-101 that, prior to the enactment of Article 5,
the law governing letters of credit consisted of "the law of con-
tracts with occasional unfortunate excursions into the law of
guaranty."'
Revised Article 5, however, makes an about-face on this
issue. Revised Uniform Commercial Code section 5-117(a) pro-
vides that:
An issuer that honors a beneficiary's presentation is subro-
gated to the rights of a beneficiary to the same extent as if
the issuer were a secondary obligor of the underlying obliga-
tion owed to the beneficiary and of the applicant to the same
extent as if the issuer were the secondary obligor of the un-
derlying obligation owed to the applicant.'
As a result, it will be necessary for letter of credit attor-
neys to familiarize themselves with the law of subrogation in
the context of secondary obligations. Subrogation is often re-
ferred to as "equitable assignment" or "assignment by opera-
tion of law," but those slogans hardly inform as to the contours
of the subrogation right. Attorneys will need to be able to an-
swer two questions: When is subrogation available? What
59. For examples of cases rejecting a finding of subrogation through total
application of suretyship principles to the letter of credit transaction, see Bank of
North Carolina, N.A. v. Rock Island Bank, 570 F.2d 202 (7th Cir. 1978); Beach v.
First Union Nat'l Bank of N.C. (In re Carley Capital Group), 119 B.R. 646 (WI).
Wis. 1990); Berliner Handels-UND Frankfurter Bank v. East Tex. Steel Facilities,
Inc. (In re East Tex. Steel Facilities, Inc.), 117 BR. 235 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990);
Bank of Am. Natl Trust & Say. Ass'n. (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 89 BR. 150
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1988); Pastor v. National Republic Bank of Chicago, 390 N.E.2d
894 (IM. 1979); New Jersey Bank v. Palladino, 389 A.2d 454 (N.J. 1978). For ex-
amples of cases accepting such application, see Wichita Eagle & Beacon Publishing
Co. v. Pacific Natl Bank of San Francisco, 493 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1974); In re
Sensor Sys., Inc., 79 B.R. 623, (Bankr. ED. Pa. 1987); In re Minnesota Kicks, Inc.,
48 B.R. 93 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985).
60. U.C.C. § 5-101 cmt. 1 (1994) (emphasis added).
61. U.C.C. § 5-117(a) (1995).
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rights does one acquire through subrogation? As a result of
this about-face in Article 5, it is likely that the extensive sub-
rogation rules in the New Restatement will receive close atten-
tion, not only from the suretyship and guaranty portion of the
credit enhancement bar, but also from the letter of credit bar.
D. Revised Uniform Commercial Code Article 9
Perhaps the most ambitious of the Uniform Commercial
Code drafting projects now in progress is the revision of Uni-
form Commercial Code Article 9, which governs security inter-
ests in personal property and fixtures. Article 9 is probably the
most innovative article in the original Uniform Commercial
Code, combining the disparate rules governing a variety of
credit enhancement mechanisms that were functionally identi-
cal but different in superficial form into one conceptually ele-
gant Article. Accordingly, revision must be undertaken with
great care. While the finished product is still several years
away, early indications are that the quality of the revisions
will be quite high.
In 1995, the first portion of the proposed revisions to Arti-
cle 9 was presented before the annual meeting of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL). While the project's formal unveiling is important,
the revision still has a long journey to travel before it culmi-
nates in a new Official Text of Article 9. The project will make
at least two more presentations to NCCUSL, and an unspeci-
fied number to the American Law Institute, before final pro-
mulgation. Then, of course, it must be adopted by the state
legislatures. Nonetheless, those with an interest in the future
of the law governing security interests in personal property are
well-advised to focus on the revision process now, before policy
debates are played out and while climate for suggested im-
provements is most conducive. A summary of the most impor-
tant substantive provisions in the most recent draft of the
revisions follows.
1. Scope
The draft proposes that the scope of Article 9 be expanded
in a number of ways. First, the exclusions from Article 9 of
security interests in tort claims and insurance proceeds have
been cut back to exclude only individuals' claims for health and
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disability insurance and personal injury recoveries.62 It should
be noted, of course, that exclusion from Article 9 does not
mean that the granting of such security interests is prohibited
(that decision is within the province of other state law) but,
rather, that such security interests, if they exist, will be gov-
erned by non-Code law.
Second, the draft proposes the possibility that security
interests in deposit accounts, which are now within the scope
of Article 9 only to the extent that the deposit accounts repre-
sent proceeds of other Article 9 collateral, be within the scope
of Article 9.63 If adopted, this proposal would eliminate one of
the most difficult problems in the law of secured fi-
nance-determination of the often obscure non-Article 9 law
that applies to a security interest in a bank account.
Third, the draft proposes that revised Article 9 include
within its scope the sales of most general intangibles for mon-
ey due or to become due.' At present, Article 9 governs not
only security interests, but the sales of accounts and chattel
paper. The proposed revision would add a third category, "pay-
ment intangibles," to the coverage of sales of rights to collect
money. 5 If adopted, the proposed revision would bring into
Article 9 both venerable transactions such as sales of the
rights to royalties, and new financial specialties such as
securitizations.
2. Choice of Law-Jurisdiction of Filing
Choice of law rules in Article 9 determine, inter alia,
which state's priority rules will govern a particular transaction
and, more importantly, in which state a financing statement
must be filed in order to perfect a security interest. Under
current Article 9, the choice of law rule depends on the type of
collateral involved.66 For most goods, the location of the collat-
eral is the key, while for intangibles such as accounts, the
determining factor is the location of the debtor.
Under the proposed draft, the law that governs most se-
62. See Proposed U.C.C. § 9-104(2), (11) (Feb. 15, 1996 drai).
63. Id. § 9-104(12)-(13) (Alternatives A & B).
64. Id. § 9-102(a)(3).
65. Id. § 9-106.
66. U.C.C. § 9-103 (1995).
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cured transactions would be the law of the jurisdiction in
which the debtor is located. Moreover, in the case of a debtor
who is a juridical person (such as a corporation), the debtor
would be deemed to be located in the jurisdiction in which it is
organized, rather than the jurisdiction in which it has its place
of business. The change to a location-of-debtor would certainly
ease the filing burden for transactions in which goods in many
states are the collateral for obligations owed by a debtor. One
might think that using the jurisdiction of organization, rather
than the principal place of business, to determine the location
of the debtor would lead to a large shift of filings (and their
concomitant revenue) to jurisdictions such as Delaware, but a
recent empirical study suggests the effect on location of filings
would be immaterial."
3. Perfection by Filing
Under current Article 9, a security interest in instruments
may be perfected, in most cases, only by the possession of the
secured party." Under the proposed revision, however, a secu-
rity interest in an instrument could be perfected by filing a
financing statement.69 The primary effect of this change
would be that filing regarding an instrument would enable the
secured party to prevail over the bankruptcy trustee under
Bankruptcy Code section 544.7" A purchaser, including a se-
cured party, who took possession of the instrument in the
ordinary course of its business without knowledge of the filed
security interest, however, would take priority over it.71
4. Financing Statements
Under current Article 9, a financing statement must de-
scribe the collateral by item or type. 2 Accordingly, it is ques-
tionable whether a secured party who has been granted a secu-
rity interest in all of the debtor's personal property can simply
67. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Why the Debtor's State of Incorporation Should be
the Proper Place for Article 9 Filing: A Systems Analysis, 79 MINN. L. REV. 577
(1995).
68. U.C.C. § 9-304 (1995).
69. Proposed U.C.C. § 9-304(a) (Feb. 15, 1996 draft).
70. Bankruptcy Code § 544, 28 U.S.C. § 544 (1994).
71. Proposed U.C.C. §§ 9-308 to 9-309 (Feb. 15, 1996 draft).
72. U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1995).
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indicate that fact on the financing statement. The proposed
revisions, on the other hand, would allow simple descriptions
of collateral such as "all assets" or "all personal property1' 3
In addition, several changes are proposed for the filing
system. First, and most important, "medium neutral" rules,
that do not depend on the filing system continuing to operate
solely with tangible written documents, are being drafted."4
Second, along with other moves that would facilitate electronic
filing, the requirement for the debtor's signature on the financ-
ing statement is proposed for elimination.75 Instead, filing an
unauthorized financing statement would simply be prohibit-
ed.7
6
5. Default
The rules governing the rights of parties to a secured
transaction after default undergo significant changes in the
proposed revision. First, the draft addresses an area which has
caused much confusion and inconsistent case law over the
years-the rights of a party who is not the owner of the col-
lateral but is liable for the obligation that it secures. Under
current Article 9, such a person (typically a guarantor) may
qualify as a debtor.77 If so, that person is entitled to all of the
protections of part 5 of Article 9 (notice of disposition, commer-
cially reasonable disposition, etc.) and may not waive most of
them.
The proposed revisions distinguish between debtors who
are owners of the collateral and other obligors. Debtor-owners
will have the full set of protections under part 5 and may not
waive them. As for other obligors, only those obligors who are
secondary obligors will have part 5 protections.78 This revision
was made because secondary obligors will be economically
affected by the disposition of the collateral. A guarantor or
other secondary obligor of the debt secured by the debtor's
collateral is affected by the disposition, because the lower the
deficiency remaining after that disposition, the less for which
73. Proposed U.C.C. § 9-402(g) (Feb. 15, 1996 draft).
74. Id. § 9-105(a)(28).
75. Id. § 9-402(a)(1).
76. Id.
77. U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(d) (1995).
78. Proposed U.C.C. §§ 9-501 to 9-507 (Feb. 15, 1996 draft).
1996]
BROOK. J. INTL L.
that obligor will be responsible. Similarly, a person other than
the debtor who has supplied other collateral for the obligation
is affected because that person's equity in that other collateral
will be affected by the disposition of the collateral supplied by
the debtor. On the other hand, the principal obligor of an obli-
gation for which a guarantor has provided collateral is not af-
fected by disposition of the collateral supplied by the guarantor
because, no matter what is received from that disposition, the
principal obligor's total liability will remain the same. Thus,
the principal obligor who has not supplied the collateral is not
protected by proposed part 5. While secondary obligors will
also have full Article 9 protections, except for secondary
obligors who are "consumer obligors," they will be able to
waive those protections. 9
Second, the rules governing strict foreclosure are changed
and extensively rewritten in the revisions. Under current law,
a secured party may propose retaining the collateral only in
total satisfaction of the secured debt."0 Under the proposed
revisions, however, the secured creditor may also propose a
"partial strict foreclosure," in which the secured party would
retain the collateral in satisfaction of an agreed portion of the
debt.8
1
Third, the proposed revisions would speak explicitly about
the sanctions imposed against a secured party who does not
follow the rules in part 5 of Article 9. Under current law, Arti-
cle 9 is largely silent in this area, speaking only briefly in
section 9-507." The result is that the states have been left to
their own devices to determine what happens when a secured
party does not follow the rules. Three approaches have devel-
oped. Under the "absolute bar" rule, a secured party who does
not play by the rules is barred from collecting any deficiency,
regardless of the harm (if any) that flowed from its violation.
Under the "damages" rule, a debtor may prove damages from a
secured party's part 5 violation, but the violation otherwise has
no effect on the secured party's right to a deficiency. Under the
"rebuttable presumption" rule, the debtor is presumed to have
suffered damages from the secured party's violation that are
79. Id. § 9-501.
80. U.C.C. § 9-505 (1995).
81. Proposed U.C.C. § 9-505 (Feb. 15, 1996 draft).
82. U.C.C. § 9-507 (1995).
[Vol. XXI:
DOMESTIC TRANSACTIONS
equal to the amount of the deficiency that would otherwise be
owed (thus canceling out the deficiency), but the secured party
may rebut this presumption by proving that the damages were
less than that amount. The proposed revisions, for the most
part, adopt the rebuttable presumption approach."
The draft also suggests a number of changes with respect
to the rights of consumer debtors after default. First, the post-
default notice of disposition of the collateral must contain, in
addition to information given to all debtors, information con-
cerning potential liability for a deficiency, and concerning
rights of redemption and reinstatement.' Second, after dispo-
sition, the secured party must provide specific information con-
cerning the calculation of any deficiency or surplus.' Third, a
consumer debtor would have the right to reinstate a secured
debt by tendering all past due payments without accelera-
tion.8
6
6. Questions for Debate
The Prefatory Note for the draft of Article 9 submitted to
the 1995 meeting of NCCUSL concludes with a list, prepared
by the reporters, of "the more important questions of policy
raised by the draft." While some of the questions are obvious,
in light of the provisions in the draft, others suggest paths that
were not taken in this draft, but may receive more consider-
ation in the near future. Two such questions are:
*Should the revised Article 9 continue to facilitate and pro-
mote the creation and enforcement of security interests?
*Should the revised Article 9 retain its priority scheme under
which perfected security interests are senior to the rights of
lien creditors and unperfected security interests are junior to
those rights? Should the revised Article 9 subordinate per-
fected security interests to the rights of certain classes of
unsecured creditors? Should the revised Article 9 subordinate
the rights of lien creditors to unperfected security interests?
83. Proposed U.C.C. § 9-507(c)(2)(ii) (Feb. 15, 1996 draft).
84. Id. § 9-504(1).
85. Id. § 9-504(n).
86. Id. § 9-506(b).
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V. CONCLUSION: Do THE NEW DEVELOPMENTS REPRESENT
IMPROVEMENT?
With the dramatic activity in the domestic law of credit
enhancement that has occurred within the last decade and
continues apace today, it is important to remember that
change is not necessarily equivalent to improvement. Do the
new developments make the law better-for either lawyers or
commercial parties?
The answer, of course, is that it is too early to tell. The
advances in each body of law governing credit enhancement
mechanisms over time are likely to diminish many unneces-
sary legal differences between the mechanisms. This, I believe,
is good. Parties to a commercial transaction should be able to
select credit enhancement mechanisms based on the economic
worth they bring to the transaction, rather than the legal bag-
gage they carry. To the extent that the governing rules move
toward a consistent understanding of the economic role played
by credit enhancement, and the legitimate needs of those sup-
plying the enhancement as well as the debtor and creditor,
those rules will facilitate the extension of credit.
Nonetheless, by the very fact that the various drafting
projects governing credit enhancement mechanisms are the
product of different groups of people, the potential is created
for similar issues to be addressed differently in different re-
gimes when there is no economic or functional reason for the
distinction. While this is probably inevitable so long as the
different mechanisms are considered to be legally distinct, even
if economically similar, perhaps the next logical step for the
growth of the law of credit enhancement would be a unified set
of principles. Perhaps the agenda for the millennium should be
the development of a Unified Field Theory of Credit Enhance-
ment.
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